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VOLU XLVI APRm, 1940 NumiBER 3
MARTIAL LAW AND HABEAS CORPUS-
JOHN H. HATcHER"
An investigator is astonished at the confusion enveloping this
subject. The literature thereon abounds with divergent statements
and is not even free from inaccurate quotations. Much of the con-
fusion of English precedents on martial law is due to their failure
to distinguish between its use in time of peace and time of war.
Some of the confusion is due to the several definitions of the term.
For example, Sir Thomas Smith, an early writer on the government
of England, said martial law was the arbitrary will of the king in
war; while a century later, Sir Mathew Hale, the legal com-
mentator, said martial law was the law imposed by the King's
Marshall for "the government, order and discipline in an army."
Some of the modern confusion has arisen from failure to dis-
tinguish between the terms military law, military government and
martial law. Military law, technically, is a legislative code of rules
and articles of war. Military government, technically, is the con-
trol imposed by the military command over conquered or disorgan-
ized territory. Infractions of military law and of military govern-
ment may be tried by military commissions, sometimes called courts-
martial; but neither military law nor military government is
martial law, as technically defined. The latter has no code of laws,
but is simply the exercise of military discretion in time of war.
The essence of martial law is said to be suspension of the writ
of habeas corpus. The confusion on the latter is but little less than
that on martial law. This writ did not issue from the mists of
primitive common law fully panoplied as many writers have as-
'Reprinted by permission of the American Bar Association Journal.
** Member of the Suipreme Court of Appeals, Charleston, West Virginia.
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sumed. On the contrary, the writ passed through a long transition
period just as did other legal writs. The learned Edward Jenks
has a clear conviction that the original use of this writ was "not to
get people out of prison, but to put them in it."' Even after the
writ was molded to test only the legality of a commitment, several
centuries passed before the writ was granted to persons committed
by the Royal order. And this was finally accomplished, not by
expansion of the common law (as some controversialists have as-
serted), but by specific acts of parliament in the seventeenth cen-
tury. In this country, further confusion regarding the writ has
arisen from the provision of the national Constitution, that "the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless
when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require
it."2  Some writers of national prominence have construed this
provision to be a delegation of power to Congress.3 Other writers
equally prominent have construed the provision to be a limitation
of congressional power.4 The division of comment on martial law
and habeas corpus caused Attorney General Cushing, in 1857, to
complain that the commentators were all at sea. The interim de-
cisions have left commentation still at sea, particularly the lead-
ing federal decisions of Ex parte Merryinan, and Ex parte Mili-
gan.
6
Ex parte Merryman. Merryman, a resident of Maryland, was
arrested May 25, 1861, under a military order and taken to Fort
Mc:Henry. Upon his petition, Chief Justice Taney issued a writ of
habeas corpus on May 26th, directed to General Cadwalader, the
commander of the fort, and returnable at eleven o'clock the next
day. At that hour, the General's return was filed, stating, in effect,
that Merryman had been arrested under order of Major General
Keim of the United States Army, and brought to Fort McHenry
charged with "various acts of treason, and with being publicly as-
sociated with and holding a commission as lieutenant in a company
having in their possession arms belonging to the United States and
avowing his purpose of armed hostility against the government."
The return further stated that General Cadwalader was informed
the charges could be "clearly established"; that he was authorized
by the President in such cases to suspend the writ of habeas corpus
1 Jenks, The Story of the Habeas Corpus (1902) 18 L. Q. REv. 65.
2 U. S. CoNST. Art. I, § 9.
3 See POMEROY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw (10th ed. 1888) § 707.
4See HALLEox, INTERNATioNAL LAW (1861) 503.
5 Taney's C. 0. Dec. 246, Fed. Cas. No. 9,487 (C. C. D. Md. 1861).
6 4 Wall. 2, 18 L. Ed. 281 (U. S. 1866).
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for the public safety; that he realized this power was "a high and
delicate trust" which he had been enjoined to exercise "with
judgment and discretion", and suggested that he be not em-
barrassed by any "unnecessary want of confidence." The return
then requested that further action be postponed until the General
could receive instructions from the President, when a further re-
turn would be made. This request was disregarded by the Chief
Justice, who forthwith issued an attachment for contempt against
General Cadwalader because he had not produced Merryman. The
marshal was unable to execute the attachment. Whereupon the
Chief Justice filed an opinion which was promptly pronounced "un-
answerable" by the supreme court of Wisconsin,7 and which has
been approved by a number of other courts.
An initial impression of Justice Taney's course in the Merry-
man case is that he was precipitate. There is a presumption, hon-
ored in all courts, that official conduct is in line of official duty.- It
would seem that this presumption should have been accorded the
military officers responsible for Merryman's detention until General
Cadwalder could have communicated with the President, and made
the further return promised.
One's attention is next arrested by the variance of the facts
stated in the opinion from the facts in the record. And one is sur-
prised that, despite General Cadwalder's declared realization that
his authority was "a high and delicate trust" to be executed with
"judgment and discretion" the opinion treats the case as one in
which the military power proposed to usurp judicial authority at
will "upon any pretext or under any circumstances." That un-
warranted approach to the case forecasts the extreme legal prop-
ositions advanced by the opinion. Its chief pronouncement is that
under the Constitution," no suspension (or disregard) whatever of
habeas corpus is lawful unless authorized by Congress. This hold-
ing is based on the theory that the right of suspension is an ex-
clusive grant of congressional power. The opinion quotes two
American authorities, Story and Marshall. The quotation from
Story postulates merely thaf Congress is the sole judge of the
exigency warranting the suspension referred to in the Constitution,
but makes no attempt to define that suspension. The quotation
from Marshall" relates specifically to the Congressional Judiciary
7 In re Kemp, 16 Wis. 382, 391 (1863).
8 Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 19, 33, 6 L. Ed. 537 (U. S. 1827).
0 U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 9.
10Ez parte Bollman, 4 Cranch 75, 101, 2 L. Ed. 554 (U. S. 1807).
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Act of 1789, and not to the Constitution. The opinion does not dis-
cuss the colonial background of the section, does not regard the
plain language of the section, and does not consider the comments
thereon of the Constitution-makers. These omissions are due per-
haps to the stated assumption that the construction adopted in the
opinion had been theretofore given by everyone, particularly (as
the opinion states), by "every jurist and statesman" in the Con-
gress which considered suspending the writ in connection with the
Burr conspiracy. My research does not find substance for the as-
sumption.
The colonists demanded the privilege of habeas corpus as Eng-
lishmen, and it was usually accorded them, though in some instances
the colonial governors were recalcitrant. "Now and then" upon
complaint by a governor that the Americans were becoming "a
factious and turbulent people, with heads turned by queer political
crotchets", the King's Privy Council would instruct the governors
to suspend the writ.:" That was done in times of peace, was solely
for purposes of discipline and was without legal justification.
Wherefore, those suspensions were resented by the colonists, But
the annals show that they acquiesced in violations of the writ in
times of war. During the Revolutionary War, the American of-
ficers disregarded the writ at will and the records of the Continental
Congress, to which several personal protests were made, disclose
no congressional action against the practice. On the contrary, in
1778, that body specifically approved the refusal of General Small-
wood to honor a writ issued by the Chief Justice of Delaware.
Madison's notes on the Constitutional Convention contain only
two comments on this section, one by Judge John Rutledge, of
South Carolina, and one by James Wilson, of Pennsylvania, both
outstanding delegates. Rutledge was for declaring the writ in-
violate on the ground that a suspension would never be necessary
"at the same time through all the states." This remark is not com-
prehensible except upon the one hypothesis, that Rutledge under-
stood the proposed suspension to be nation-wide. Wilson merely
"doubted whether in any case a suspension could be necessary, as
the discretion now exists with judges, in most important cases, to
keep in gaol or admit to bail." Prisoners gaoled and subject to
bail at judicial discretion were civil, not military, prisoners. The
latter were ordinarily detained in prison camps, not subject to bail
at all, and held or released at the discretion of the commanding
11 FisIKE, AmERICAN REVOLUTION (1899) 2.
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officer. So it is apparent that Wilson understood the section to
apply to civil arrests. This understanding was in no wise strained,
because, on occasion, civil officials had been given legislative author-
ity to disregard the writ. For example, in May, 1781, the Virginia
Assembly empowered the governor to have arrested and con-
fined, without benefit of habeas corpus, .any person he had good
cause to suspect of disloyalty. Thus the only recorded construc-
tion of this section within the convention itself is that it related
to a nation-wide suspension of the writ as to civil arrests. Gov-
ernor Randolph, of Virginia, himself a framer of the Constitution,
in a speech to the Virginia Convention which ratified the Constitu-
tion, associated the section with civil arrests, saying: "I contend
that, by virtue of the power given to Congress to regulate courts,
they could suspend the writ of habeas corpus. This is therefore an
exception to that power."' 2  Before the same convention, Mr.
Nicholas, Mr. Grayson and Mr. Henry, and before a like conven-
vention in Massachusetts, Judge Sumner also construed the sec-
tion to be a restraint on congressional power, and that construction
was questioned by none.' 3 The Merryman opinion does not name
the jurists and statesmen in Congress who discussed the Burr con-
spiracy, but in the Annals of Congress 1807, wherein it was dis-
cussed, I find only three constructions of the provision, to wit,
those by Representatives Broom, Holland and Campbell, all of
whom said that the provision was a restriction of Congressional
power.' 4 The phrasing of the Constitution was done by masters of
the English language. It is not consistent with their skill that an
exclusive grant of power should have been expressed in negative
words alone. If the sententious language of the section be given
its ordinary meaning, then the construction of Randolph and his
contemporaries is patently correct. The "shall not" of the section
12 3 ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE FEERaL CONSTITUTION (1836) 464. Senator
Wall of New Jersey quoted Governor Randolph as saving to the Convention,
June 10, 1788, that the writ could be suspended here only by "The Legislature
... never by the Executive." CONGRESSION.L GLOBE (1862-3) 1462. That
quotation is not sustained- by the official record of the Governor's remarks.
See 3 ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 203.
13 3 id. at 102, 449, 461, and 2 id. 108-9.
'4 9 ANNALS OF CONG. 2d Sess. 503, 540 (1807). Representative Campbell
said: "This provision evidently relates to Congress, and was intended to pre-
vent that body from suspending by law the writ of habeas corputs except in
cases stated, and has no relation whatever to the act of an individual in refusing
to obey the writ. Such refusal or disobedience would not certainly suspend
the privilege of the writ, and must be considered in the same point of view as
the violation of any other public law made to protect the liberty of the citizen."
Specifically accordant with the second sentence: Representatives Holland and
Masters.
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can mean naught but prohibition, and standing alone would be
absolute; but to the "shall not" the public emergency is an ex-
ception. That the section was thought necessary at all implies the
conception of the framers, that Congress, through another pro-
vision of the Constitution, had been given a power over habeas
corpus. I see no reason to controvert Governor Randolph's position
that such power was an incident of the congressional power to regu-
late the federal courts. The framers knew that in wartime Con-
gress could not forsee the necessity of most military arrests, and
that the imperative need of quick and sometimes secret military
action in such cases could not await congressional investigation.
Unless it be taken that the framers were unmindful of this knowl-
edge; unless it can be demonstrated that Rutledge, Wilson and Ran-
dolph did not speak the understanding of their follows, then the
section was designed to be not an exclusive grant of all power over
habeas corpus to Congress, as the Merryman opinion holds, but a
specific restriction on congressional power to have the courts sus-
pend the writ; and the section has no bearing on the occasional or
local disregard of the writ by a military commander. I submit with
deference, that no opinion on this subject is "unanswerable" which
does not answer Rutledge, Wilson and Randolph.
The Merryman opinion attempts to correlate the status of the
writ under the Federal Government with that of the writ under
the common and the statutory laws of England. This attempt
overlooks the fact that such laws were not adopted by the Constitu-
tion and could not bind the Federal Government in any manner.
The opinion deduces from commentaries on the English government
that only Parliament could suspend the writ of habeas corpus in
England, and reasons accordingly that only Congress could suspend
it in the United States. The opinion overlooks the repeated
declarations of the Constitution-makers that our situation was en-
tirely different from that in England and that "the British govern-
ment cannot be our model.""' A power may not be accredited to
Congress because Parliament has it, but only if the Constitution
delegates it. Neither is congressional power expanded by the com-
mon law, for "... the United States, as a Federal Government,
155 ELLIOT, op. t. supra n. 12, at 137, 141, 153, 165, 168, 188, 234. "Wo
are constantly running away with the idea of the excellence of the British
Parliament, and, with or without reason, copying from them; when, in fact,
there is no similitude in our situations." Delegate Pierce Butler of South
Carolina to the Convention on June 13, 1787. 1 id. at 409.
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has no common law. .... ,,16 Pursuing the unwarranted analogy
to the English government, the Merryman opinion charges that if
the President may suspend the writ, then the Constitution has con-
ferred on him more regal and absolute powers than England had
entrusted to its Crown. That charge also fails, because at the
time our Constitution was formed and prior thereto even to the
days of the Conqueror, the right of the Crown, as the supreme
military commander, to administer martial law in time of national
danger, if necessary, had been consistently recognized. In 1565,
Sir Thomas Smith, in his Commonwealth of England, wrote: "In
war time and in the field, the Prince hath also absolute power, so
that his word is a law." This same power was recognized in the
celebrated Ship Maney case in 1637 by judges and lawyers alike,
the able St. John, though opposing the Crown, saying: " . . . it
must needs be granted that in this business of Defence, the suprema.
potestas is inherent in his majesty, as part of his crown and kingly
dignity." Furthermore, Parliament, which alone speaks with final-
ity for England, in three separate acts near the date of the Con-
stitution17 referred to this power as the "acknowledged preroga-
tive" and as the "undoubted prerogative" of the Crown.
The Merryman opinion brushes aside any possible argument in
favor of the government's right to suspend the writ even "for
self-defense in time of tumult and danger", on the ground that the
government is one of delegated powers only, and such a power is
not granted. The opinion treats the President as commander-in-
chief of our military forces merely "from necessity and the nature
of his duties," and concedes no military right to arrest a civilian
"except in aid of the judicial authority and subject to its control."
And the opinion would exalt constitutional guarantees of personal
rights and property, including trial by jury, above the necessities
of war. The opinion thus ignores the express constitutional pro-
visions whiah authorize the government to wage war and which
make the President the commander-in-chief of the army and the
navy of the United States. The opinion takes no account of the
common thought among all nations from the dawn of history that
in times of peril the conservation of the nation may demand "the
sacrifice of the legal rights of a few" and may not only justify,
but compel, the temporary abandonment of civil procedure.'8 This
16 United States v. Worrall, 2 fall. 384, 394, 1 L. Ed. 426 (U. S. 1798).
Accord: Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch 75, 93-4, 2 L. Ed. 554 (U. S. 1807).
17 39 GEO. III, c. 11; 43 GO. M1I, c. 117; 3 & 4 Wx. IV, c. 4.
18 HALLA, CONSTITUTIONAL HISoy o ENGLAND (1876) 240.
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thought is based on the first law of nature, the right of self preser-
vation. Whatever is necessary to preserve that right is lawful. A
conflict between hostile nations is a struggle for self-preservation.
wherein civil rights may lawfully be disregarded. "Inter arrna,
silent leges", said Cicero. Whatever else their disagreement, those
two great antagonists, Jefferson and Hamilton, concurred in this:
that the impulse of self-preservation, whether individual or na-
tional, surmounted all civil laws, and that the duty to save the
country when in danger was a greater duty than that to respect
property or personal rights.19 Unnoticed by the Merryman opinion
is "an unbroken sequence" of English decisions from the earliest
year books down to the formation of our Constitution, upholding
the right of the Crown in time of war forthwith to occupy fields,
raze houses, impress civilians, make precautionary arrests, sequester
noncombatants and even execute hostile subjects if the exigency
admitted no delay.20  "Flagranto bello", said the court of the
King's Bench in 1776, "the common law has never interfered with
the army."
21
The framers of our Constitution were familiar with ancient
history, and with the English decisions. Most of the framers, in-
cluding their presiding officer, General Washington, had taken an
active part in the recent war with England. In that war, they
had seen their armies, following the English custom, occupy, use
or destroy private property as the apparent necessity demanded;
they had seen loyal civilian population subjected to military con-
trol; some had seen their officers disregard civil process, including
writs of habeas corpus; and some had been with General Wash-
ington at Tarrytown where he asserted authority to hang the
civilian, Joshua Hett Smith, immediately, as a traitor, and stated
that nothing could save him but a candid confession of his con-
nection with the Andre affair. The lawfulness of those means was
not questioned, and since the framers placed no specific limitation
on the war power, they must have expected it to employ those same
means in defending the government of the United States. If those
means override the other constitutional provisions, the framers must
have so intended; and those means themselves become the law of
195 Jm'EPrso's ComPiLED Wonxs (1899) 542; THE FEDERALIST, No.
XXIII.
20 Richards, Martial Law (1902) 18 L. Q. REv. 133, 136.
21 Barwis v. Keppel, 2 Wils. K. B. 314, 318, 95 Eng. Rep. R. 831 (1766).
Accordant pronouncements were later made by English lord chancellors in Ex
parte Marais, [1901] A. C. 109, 115; Tilonko v. Attorney General, [1907] A. C.
93, 95.
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the land, and are due process under the Constitution. This doctrine
is neither original nor novel. It was stated without controversion
in 1628 by Serjeant Ashley in the great English Parliamentary de-
bates which preceded the preparation of the Petition of Right, as
follows: "The Martial Law. . . though not to be used in times of
peace . . . yet in times of invasion, or other times of hostility, when
an army-royal is in the field, and offences are committed, which re-
quire speedy reformation, and cannot expect the solemnity of legal
trials; then such imprisonment, execution, or other justice done
by the law-martial is warrantable, for it is then the law of the land,
and is jus gentium [the law of the nations] . . ."21 This doctrine
was specifically applied to our Constitution in McCulloch v. Mary-
land, wherein the court said "the government which has a right
to do an act, and has imposed on it the duty of performing that act,
must, according to the dictates of reason, be allowed to select the
means; ... That any means adapted to the end, any means which
tended directly to the execution of the constitutional powers of the
government, were in themselves constitutional."
2 3
The bane of inaccuracy did not escape several commentators
on the Merrynan case. Mir. Tucker in his work on the Constitution
says: "The President never acted in the matter so as to release
Merryman. ' 24  Mr. Bailey in his work on habeas corpus,23 fol-
lows Tucker. According to these authors, .Merryman, unreleased,
still is waiting, still is waiting. War of the Rebellion shows that
Merryman was "transferred to civil authority" sometime (date
not given) prior to February 17, 1862.26 The usually reliable
Warren in his work on the Supreme Court, after referring to the
storm of public criticism which met the Merryman opinion, says
that four years later it was "strongly upheld" in the majority
opinion of the Milligan case. "Never", says Mr. Warren, "did a
fearless Judge receive a more swift or more complete vindica-
tion. '27 The unvarnished truth is, the facts in the two cases are
dissimilar; the principles necessarily involved in the two cases are
not the same; the Milligan opinion does not mention the Merryman?
case at all, and is so inconsistent and inaccurate that what vindi-
cation, if any, the opinion affords Chief Justice Taney is tenuous
indeed.
22 3 State Tr. 149 (1809).
23 4 Wheat. 316, 409, 419, 4 L. Ed. 579 (U. S. 1819).
24 TUCKER, CoNsTITUTIoN 01 UNITED STATES (1899) § 318.
25 BAILEy ON HABEAS CORPUS (1913) § 110.
26 2 WAR OF THE REBELLION, Official Records (2d series) 226.
27 3 WARatEN, SUPREME CouRT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (1922) 96.
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Ex parte MHiligan. Milligan, a citizen of Indiana, charged
with conspiracy and insurrection against the government of the
United States, was tried and sentenced in 1864 by a military com-
mission appointed by the President under express congressional
authority. The Supreme Court, upon habeas corpus, held unani-
mously that the commission had no jurisdiction over Milligan. The
holding itself is not here questioned; but the opinion of the court,
written by Associate Justice Davis, made some majority pronounce-
ments on martial law which (only) are seriously questioned.2
The Davis opinion says: "No doctrine, involving more pernicious
consequences was ever invented by the wit of man than that any
of its [the Constitution's] provisions can be suspended during any
of the great exigencies of government." ' 29  Standing alone, that
declaration would support Taney, but later the Davis opinion,
after referring to the fact that in every war, certain measures
deemed necessary by the government, would be opposed by some
citizens, makes this entirely inconsistent admission: "In the emer-
gency of the times, an immediate public investigation according to
law may not be possible; and yet, the peril to the country may be
too imminent to suffer such persons to go at large. Unquestion-
ably, there is then an exigency which demands that the government.
if it should see fit in the exercise of a proper discretion to make
arrests, should not be required to produce the persons arrested in
answer to a writ of habeas corpus. ' 30 The Davis opinion, calmly
ignoring this admission, then says: "Martial rule can never exist
where the courts are open, and in the proper and unobstructed ex-
ercise of their jurisdiction." 31 This test of martial law is patently
incomplete, since it does not provide further that the courts should
be competent "to avert threatened danger" and "to punish, with
adequate promptitude and certainty, the guilty conspirators. '"32
(Opinion of Chief Justice Chase.) Indubitably, the acid test must
28 Warren, Spies, and the Power of Congress to Subject Certain Classes of
Cvilians to Trial by Military Tribunal (1919) 53 AMt. L. Rsv. 195, 209: "...
it is evident that some of the expressions of Davis, J., in Ez Parte Milligan...
[Mr. Warren's "complete vindication" of Taney, C. J.] were loosely and
probably inaccurately used .... " And howl
The celebrated phrase of the Davis opinion, "The Constitution of the United
States is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace", 4 Wall. 2,
at 120, was preceded by that of Senator Saulsbury before the Senate, January
8, 1863, " .... that Constitution which was made for all times, for peace as
well as war."
294 Wall. 2, 121, 18 L. Ed. 281 (U. S. 1866).
30 Id. at 125.
31 id. at 127.
32 Id. at 141.
10
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be, can the courts handle the emergency? The Davis opinion also
states that "Martial law cannot arise from a threatened invasion.
. . . It is also confined to the locality of actual war.' '3  These
prescriptions are myopic. A hostile army on our border "might
necessitate extraordinary measures . . . although no hostile force
had crossed the line." 34  Excepting military defeat, few acts im-
pair military morale more than persistent civilian attempts to pre-
vent enlistments, procure desertions, weaken confidence and inform
the enemy. These treasonous acts may be in places far from and
unaffected outwardly by actual warfare. But since civil procedure
is not suited to deal effectively with such acts, the military com-
mander must have and must exercise the power to suppress them
no matter where occurring. "There may be a state of war at any
place where aid and comfort can be effectually given to the enemy,
having regard to the modern conditions of warfare and means of
communication.' ',
The Constitution should be construed as a whole, and all pro-
visions harmonized if possible. But where a general power is
plainly conferred for a vital purpose, such as the power to wage
war, any provision which would limit the power must be equally
vital. The occasional preservation of personal or property rights
is not comparable to the preservation of the nation. This state-
ment bears not the faintest implication that the military power may
act wantonly. Martial rule is justified as well as limited by the
emergency. Justification may be absolute today and wanting to-
morrow, if the exigency has terminated. Every military act in
violation of civil rights may later be judged civilly by the ap-
parent necessity for it, and the actor held accountable by the civil
law for any unwarranted invasion of personal or property rights.
Even after twenty years, the English Colonial Governor Wall was
not only brought to judgment, but was hanged for his ruthless ad-
ministration of martial law following an insurrection."
33 IAd. at 127.
342 HARE, AxERICAx CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1889) 965. Accord: 3 WIL-
LOUGHBY, CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1929) § 1051.
35 Pollock, What Is MartiaZ Law (1902) 18 L. Q. REV. 152, 157.
38 The attorney general (later, Lord Ellenborough) said to the jury concern-
ing Wall, that if the circumstances disclosed a reasonable degree of necessity
for his conduct, "God forbid that a hair of his head should be touched."
During the War of 1812, General Jackson placed New Orleans under mar-
tial law, and banished Dominick A. Hall, a federal judge who issued a writ of
habeas corpns for a military prisoner. When civil authority was restored, Hall
imposed a fine on Jackson of $1,000.00 for alleged contempt, which the latter
paid. (Money to reimburse Jackson for the fine was immediately raised in
New Orleans by popular subscription; but he, with princely gesture, had the
11
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The Davis opinion is surprisingly inadvertent in its pre-
cedential quotations. The opinion states that in reversing the
attainder of Thomas, Earl of Lancaster, 1327, the English Parlia-
ment adjudged that in time of peace no man should be tried for
any offense except by the king's courts, and " 'that regularly when
the king's courts are open it is a time of peace in judgment of
law.' -37 Neither the Latin copy of that judgment,38 nor its Eng-
lish translation 39 contains the quotation, in form or substance. It
is true that in later years a legal saying arose in England that a
place where the courts were open should be regarded as a place of
peace. But in medieval times the military disturbances were usual-
ly limited to the localities occupied by armed forces, and elsewhere
orderly civil procedure was not interrupted. The yardstick of
peace in those times is too short for measurement now, since in-
creased facilities of comnmunication and locomotion now extend the
disturbances of war to places remote from armed camps. 40
The Davis opinion is equally inattentive in stating that during
the celebrated parliamentary debate concerning the trial of the
missionary, John Smith, by a military tribunal in British Guiana,
Lord Brougham and Sir James Mackintosh said: "When the laws
can act, every other mode of punishing supposed crimes is itself
an enormous crime."41 This quotation is attempted from a speech
of Sir James but is not correct. He unequivocally defended mar-
tial rule in case of necessity, and, following that defense, said, not
"when the laws can act", but "As soon as the laws can act," etc..4 1
Lord Brougham also conceded that in case of invasion or rebellion,
"when there is no time for the slow and cumbrous proceedings of
the civil law,"' 43 martial law was justifiable. And while both of
those statesmen did denounce the trial, they did not speak for Eng-
land, as the House of Commons, which did so speak, confirmed the
trial.
44
The Davis opinion continues remiss in declaring that our Revo-
lutionary fathers characterized the proclamation of martial law at
Boston by General Gage as an "attempt to supersede the course
money given to the families of soldiers, who had fallen in defense of the city.
In 1844, Congress repaid him the fine, with interest.)
37 4 Wall. 2, 128.
38 In 1 HALE'S PLEAS OF THE CROWN (1778) c. 26.
39 1 HOWELL'S STATE TRrALS (1809) 39 et seq.
40 Dodd, The Case of Marais (1902) 18 L. Q. REv. 147.
414 Wall. 2, 128.
42 Id. at 54-55.
43 Id. at 54.
44 Id. at 99.
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of the common law, and instead thereof to publish and order the
use of martial law.'' The quotation was evidently attempted
from a declaration of the Continental Congress. Here is what the
records show. On June 12, 1775, General Gage, claiming authority
from the Royal Charter of Massachusetts, and stating that "justice
cannot be administered by the common law of the land, the
course whereof has for a long time past been violently impeded,
and wholly interrupted," proclaimed martial law "for so long
time as the present unhappy occasion shall necessarily require.
• . . "4 A committee was at once appointed by the Massachusetts
Provincial Congress to consider "the late extraordinary proclama-
tion" of General Gage. The report of the committee was filed
June 16, 1775, and denied neither his claim of authority nor his
statement that the common law was not being administered. The
matter was taken up then by the Continental Congress, which on
July 6, 1775, issued a declaration, reciting merely that General
Gage by proclamation, "proceeds [not attempts] to supersede
the course of the common law", etc., but not controverting his
statement that the course of the common law had been impeded
and interrupted. Assuming that his statement was correct, be-
cause not challenged by those representative bodies, there should be
no serious doubt of his lawful right to impose martial law.
47
The Davis opinion is finally inexact in saying: "The Vir-
ginia Assembly, also, denounced a similar measure on the part of
Governor Dunmore 'as an assumed power, which the king himself
cannot exercise; because it annuls the law of the land and intro-
duces the most execrable of all systems, martial law.' ,,45 Hen-
ning's Statutes at Large of the Virginia Asseinbly contain no such
denouncement. What the opinion evidently referred to is a
"declaration" by a convention of Virginia delegates on December
13, 1775, since the declaration does contain the phrases quoted,
though widely separated and in no sense connected by the word
"because" or any other word. The declaration did execrate mar-
tial law, but did so hypothetically. In a different connection,
entirely, the declaration did reprobate Lord Dunmore's attempt,
45 Id. at 128.
40 2 AMERICAN ARCHrVFS (4th series, 1839) 970. General Gage was regularly
appointed governor of Massachusetts, and he referred to this provision in the
charter: "And Wee Doe by these presents .... Ordaine that the Governor
shall have full power .... to use and exercise the Law Martial in time of
actual .... Rebellion as occasion shall necessarily require .... "
47 See id. at 1416, 1868.
48 4 Wall. 2, 128,
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as the declaration charged, to employ martial law in violation of
the "constitution" (charter) of Virginia, and against loyal sub-
jects of the King of England, in order "to intimidate the good
people of this Colony into a compliance with his [Dunmore's]
arbitrary will."' 49  And this it was - the use of martial law
arbitrarily - that the declaration said the king himself could not
do. Upon the allegations of the declaration, the Dunmore procla-
mation was clearly unjustified; but the sentiments of the declara-
tion do not warrant the reallignment of its phrases as was done
in the Davis quotation.
In conclusion, I submit deferentially: In this world of arms,
constitutional civil rights will endure only if protected by arms.
The constitutional duthority of the United States government to
wage war, being unrestricted, implies the full use of the war power.
That power is the power of necessity, than which none is greater.,
What necessity requires, it justifies. Wherefore, not only upon
the actual theater of war, but wherever an emergency of war arises,
the violation of every civil constitutional right impeding the war
power is justified, if necessary. At peace, civil law should be ab-
solute; at war, martial rule, wherever necessary, must be absolute.
49 4 A mEIcAN ARCHIVES 81.
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